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Therefore, as far as the unity of the CWS is the unity of complex behavior, there is no contradiction between the CWS theory and the present one. Accordingly, the control of new, unskilled actions is frequently conscious. The question is why the common working place of consciousness is common.
From my point of view, it is not because a group of processing modules has decided, in a democratic or dictatorial way, that a given piece of information is interesting enough to make it accessible for the whole audience, but because complex behavior cannot be organized other than by coordinating all activity to a common pattern.
Likewise, we do not make two conscious decisions simultaneously not because the two must compete for one scene, but because, if we did make them simultaneously, how would we realize these decisions? The answer is: serially, one after the other. The model is presented that conceives of human consciousness as a product of a phylogenetic interaction of three particular forms of animal behavior: play, tool use, and communication.
When the three components meet in humans, they strengthen and mutually reinforce each other producing positive feedback loop. Therefore, although all three elements of human consciousness are present in many animal species not necessarily human predecessors , there is no other species that plays, communicates and uses tools as much as humans do.
The suggested three-component structure permits to easily explain most typical features of human conscious awareness: its recursive character, seriality, objectivity, close relation to semantic and episodic memory, etc. Other specific features of human consciousness e. Finally, a comparison of the current approach with other theories of consciousness embodiment theories, simulation theories, common working place reveals, notwithstanding some similarities, important differences from all of them.
Again due to space limits, the complex relationships of this model of consciousness with the multiple draft theory, the re-entrance theory, and the classical dualistic approach must remain outside the present text. The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and approved it for publication. The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Fragments of the text were written with the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG , other portions were supported by Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. Some ideas presented here emerged in discussions with J. Vanessa Singh commented an early version of the manuscript. I am particularly indebted to my students because the general view presented in this paper could only be developed within the interaction during teaching.
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